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Unfinished Nazism. Chapter 9. Russia and Russians During the Formation and Restoration of Nazism. The War for Independence

Aleksandr Shchipkov

Nazism does not exist in a historical vacuum. It is always immersed in the current geopolitical context, which is dynamic and continually changing. The historical logic of Nazism and its associated phenomena have profoundly influenced the fate of Russia and its people in the 20th and 21st centuries.

The central event in this regard is the Great Patriotic War of 1941 – 1945 and the genocide of the population of the USSR1. Often overlooked (and during the Soviet period simply not mentioned) is that this genocide had its historical prologue: the repression against the Russian Orthodox population by Austria-Hungary at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries2. There are many documents and testimonies about this period3. And finally, 2014 – 2023, we witnessed its continuation. In the 2010s, the genocide of Russians, or «Russocide», came to be known as the «Scaffold»4.

But let's turn to the key events of this story.

It is important to remember that in the Third Reich, as part of the «Ost» plan to clear the «eastern territories», the war with the USSR was considered and called «ethnic». Paradoxically, it was only in 2022, when the confrontation with Nazism again entered a «hot» phase, that Russia officially recognized that Russians were one of the peoples subjected to genocide5. Despite the existence of a huge memorial project in honor of the Great Victory of 1945, and with book series about pioneer heroes and lectures by veterans in schools, the USSR did not recognize the fact of genocide. Even in Russia, despite the enormous popular support for the Immortal Regiment, it was not recognized. This is a significant point to ponder.

It is also significant that the Scaffold period is not yet completed; it continues (consider Donetsk, Izyum, Kupyansk, and the teachers who were shot). While the Jews have already experienced their Catastrophe, the Russians continue to experience their own. In this regard, it is necessary to institutionalize the «memory policy», especially since the groundwork for this has already been laid. The concept of the Russian Catastrophe (the Scaffold) has long been firmly established in scientific and political discourse.

The issue of so-called «allies» and «partners» is of particular importance. During the Second World War, the confrontation between England with the United States and Germany was situational, not ideological. It was only after the collapse of the Reich in 1945 that this conflict was framed as a struggle of «democracy against totalitarianism». However, the Anglo-American elites have always been aware of the illusory nature of this «ideology for the poor» and the myths surrounding denazification.

For instance, Stephen Kotkin, a professor at Princeton University, openly states in his lectures that Russia did not win the Great Patriotic War but ultimately lost. He argues that the withdrawal of Soviet-Russian troops from Germany and the former Warsaw Pact countries by 1994 signified a capitulation: «Like Napoleon's army, Russian troops retreated along the same roads deep into Russia in the early 90s... It took a long time, but the whole huge Victory building turned out to be destroyed in the fullness of time»6.

In reality, for Britain and the United States, the Third Reich was a natural ally in achieving long-term goals. Therefore, the Cold War was a continuation of the Great Patriotic War: the United States and NATO perpetuated the German cause, and the global Anglo-American world became analogous to the «Third Reich». Today, the Anglo-American coalition continues the war with Russia, grounded in the values of Atlanticism, a modern radical form of Protestant modernism.

A new war in Europe has once again become a war between Russia and fascism – only this time, fascism is called Anglo-American «democracy». Allegedly denazified Germany, along with its Anglo-American overlord, supported neo-Nazism in Ukraine in 2022 both politically and with arms supplies.

Strictly speaking, the ethnic, or as Hitler termed it, «racial war» with Russia has not ceased for decades. Only its ideological formats and political idioms have changed, such as «cold war», «competition of two systems», the fight against «Soviet totalitarianism», «pan-Slavism», «Judeo-Bolshevism» (Hitler's term), «imperial policy of Russia», «Putinism», «Rashism», and «ideology of the Russian world».

The essence of the confrontation has remained the same, despite «cold» and «hot» periods. The target of military, political, economic, and ideological attacks has always been the Russian civilizational foundation, which has remained unchanged despite revolutions and regime changes.

The Atlanticist propaganda machine has continuously sought to create a fragmented image of Russian history for Russians themselves, exaggerating internal cultural and regional differences.

In the 1980s, the «Soviet project» was dismantled by the liberal faction within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, leading to the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet legacy. This process involved not only the dismantling of economic institutions, industry, science, and culture but also a systematic destruction of Russian communitarianism during the years of post-Soviet nomenclature capitalism. Under the influence of liberal propaganda in the 1990s, part of the population believed in the possibility of a society devoid of ideology and values. Once again, Russian society embarked on a path of historical rupture, but the communal social matrix in Russia could not be completely destroyed. It reasserted itself in 2014 through the Russian irredenta and the Crimean consensus.

The post-Soviet model of capitalism, culturally Protestant in origin, deeply contradicted the historical experience of the Russian people. Therefore, the 1990s slogan of «Desovietization» was objectively directed not just against the Soviet era but against the entire Russian tradition and national historical continuity. During this period, the collective consciousness of Russians was inundated with myths about the extinction of the «nation's gene pool», collective historical guilt, an inability to self-organize, and «genetic slavery». These narratives reflected an information war waged against Russians by the liberal successors of Hitlerism, aiming to paralyze society by imposing an artificial, negative (leading to self-destruction) globalist identity. These narratives were propagated within Russia by the liberal faction, formed from the remnants of the Soviet intelligentsia, the creative «middle» class, and the «Bolotnaya» asset – a faction that verbally disavowed Nazism while diligently cultivating and exploiting its modern forms.

The persistent denial of the concept of the «Russian world» by the liberal Western establishment, contrasted with the acceptance of similar concepts like the «Arab», «Turkic», or «British» world, is telling. The main aim of this denial is to erase Russians as a political entity.

The «war with monuments» is also noteworthy, where figures like Suvorov, Zhukov, Pushkin, Gorky, Stalin, and Alexander III are simultaneously removed from pedestals by Nazi across Europe and Ukrainian territories. Meanwhile, in Western metropolises, the terms «Russian» and «Russians» have historically encompassed and continue to denote a range of concepts including «Russian», «Russian-speaking», «Soviet», and in many respects, «post-Soviet».

The concept of the «Russian world», introduced into public discourse by Patriarch Kirill and its strengthening in the public consciousness, became a precursor to the reunification of Russians.

The «Russian world» refers to a territory of compact historical residence of native speakers of the Russian language and Russian culture bearers. It is defined by two criteria: first, it includes people for whom, regardless of their place of residence, the Russian language and culture are primary, acquired through upbringing and education. Second, it excludes those who, for various reasons, consciously identify with another nation.

National unification is impossible without a comprehensive understanding of the historical narrative of the people, including both its heroic and tragic aspects. For full unification, Russians need to reassess the history of the last century, reevaluating the causes and consequences of the genocide – the Scaffold – they faced from the early twentieth century (including the genocide of Orthodox Ruthenians before and during World War I) to the early twenty-first century.

Russians are the world's largest divided people. Our ongoing struggle against Western globalism has two facets. On one hand, it is a war for independence and unification of the divided Russian people; on the other, it is a battle to preserve the civilization of authentic Christianity – essentially a religious war. The terror unleashed by Washington against Orthodoxy confirms this.

The Western Atlanticist Alliance refuses to accept Russians as a unified people. The so-called «integration» of Russia into the «Western world» is only conceivable if Russia is divided, leading to the fragmentation of the Russian people. This means that following the separation of the Little Russians and Belarusians from the Russians that has already occurred, a new wave of national disintegration is being planned.

A notable plan for the «decolonization», or dismantling, of Russia is outlined by the Hudson Institute7, established in the 1960s by military strategist Herman Kahn and his colleagues from the RAND Corporation. This plan envisions dividing the Russian Federation into multiple states.

A deliberate strategy to reduce demographics is being pursued. It is no coincidence that in 2022, the Honored Nobel Laureate, former Polish President Lech Walesa infamously called for reducing Russia's population to 50 million people (that is, effectively advocating for the deaths of two-thirds of its citizens).

It is clear what is going to happen in the field of ideology. The Russian World, Russian identity and the genocides perpetrated against Russians in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries will be labeled as «Nazi», leading to ritual harassment, discrimination, and prosecution of those who defend them.

Literary Russian language will be banned, replaced by various folk dialects, that exist on the territory of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The ultimate and long–standing goal here is to destroy the literary linguistic norm that underpins the national tradition in science, art, and religion. English will be elevated to unprecedented status, becoming the dominant language in prestigious fields such as law, economics, finance, philosophy, theology, political science, sociology, and psychology. In everyday language, Russian words with positive connotations will be replaced by Anglicisms, and negative words will remain Russian.

These initiatives once again underscore the obvious: Nazism is not solely a German phenomenon but a pan-European one. Russian citizens are now the targets of a Nazi policy of ethnic «normalization».

The intentions of the Western elites clearly reminiscent of methods and technologies historically applied to the indigenous population of America and the peoples of the world's outskirts. This approach essentially amounts to military colonization and territorial cleansing. This perspective means the eradication of Russians as a historical entity. This is nothing more than the long-familiar «ethnic war», a continuation of the one waged by Hitler against the USSR, as well as some of his predecessors against the Russian Empire.

In such a historical reality, national consensus is crucial for Russia's survival. It requires the interaction of different codes of the Russian tradition – Orthodox, Soviet, and pre-revolutionary – and the mutual translation of these codes within a unified Russian discourse. Without fulfilling these conditions, a national consensus cannot take place, allowing for the potential of contrasting these codes with one another, thus causing civil conflicts over issues like renaming, monument installations, film content, etc.

A detailed system of cultural concepts for the Russian world can be created, encompassing components such as Orthodox ethics, social justice, social equality, and the priority of morality over law. Despite their historical convergence in irreconcilable struggle, the pre-revolutionary world and the Soviet world share common roots and equally reflect Russian identity.

For the West, Russian identity and its associated civilizational uniqueness pose a serious existential problem. Russia reminds the West of its own rejected historical path, while simultaneously being perceived as a historical alter ego, a «shadow».

At the heart of Russian identity lies the imperative of searching for or building a «kingdom of truth», where everyone is needed, no one is superfluous, no one builds their happiness on another's misfortune, and everyone is united by spiritual bonds and common tasks. The image of Holy Russia as a «vessel of true faith» and the image of social justice, «a society of equality and brotherhood», are different projections of one idea, part of a unified whole. Ideology may change signs, but the eschatological matrix remains in historical memory, being an indivisible whole.

The cultural and historical development of Russia is characterized by a unique vertical dynamic. One reason for this is the absence of the Renaissance and Reformation in Russia's cultural and historical trajectory, which, in the long-term perspective, becomes an advantage rather than a disadvantage.

Despite the fact that the standards of the Enlightenment revolution were imposed in Russia through dictatorial methods and at an accelerated pace, Russia, albeit in a passive form, retained the vertical dynamic of development characteristic of a Christian nation (similar to what Byzantium maintained up to a certain point associated with the Florentine Union). This dynamic of authentic Christianity is linked to the deification – cosmotheosis, in particular, the pursuit of a social ideal. In the context of Russian culture, this pursuit generates the question, «How can we make society better?» rather than a fatalistic, quasi-religious worship of blind «progress», which itself is both a goal and a set of evaluation criteria.

Today, Russian society is gradually and painfully shedding the mythologems of negative identity that have governed it for many decades. However, there is still no guarantee that this process is irreversible and will not be reversed, especially given the fierce and growing external opposition to the sovereignization of the country.

Atlanticist leaders have always sought to destroy Russia and Russians as a historical whole, regardless of the ideological differences among various people and groups. They have always understood the secondary nature of ideological systems and doctrines and thus sought to shift our attention to secondary ideological issues that distract from the development of a historically sound national strategy.

The war has once again entered a hot phase and is now being waged openly. Without a counter-ideology supporting the struggle of Russians for their existence, it is impossible to resist the challenge of the Atlanticist West. This is a key condition for Russian mobilization. Such an ideology will inevitably be based on an analysis of Nazism (more broadly, of various forms of racism and fascism) as the core of the Western European mentality that has existed for centuries and defines the vector of development of Western civilization in the spirit of «Drang nach Osten». Of course, recognizing the colonialist (and neo-colonialist) roots of Nazism will be of particular importance. Indeed, Auschwitz or Thalerhof are natural outcomes of a system entrenched in centuries of colonial oppression.

2024 ãîä