Almost immediately after the fall of the Third Reich, Western liberal elites adopted a consensus approach: formally condemn the Hitler regime (alongside the communist one), but rehabilitate the ideological foundations of Hitlerism. This paved the way for the transition from Hitlerism to the ideology of liberal racism – a kind of «racism with a human face». Concurrently, albeit at a slower pace, the rehabilitation of Nazism itself as a certain type of ideology began, culminating by 2014.
The process unfolded in several stages.
By this juncture, the narrow interpretation of the term «fascism» as denoting «Mussolini's regime» had already broadened to encompass and equate with the concept of «Nazism». Subsequently, through the efforts of authors such as Hannah Arendt, Karl Popper, and their adherents, there emerged a trend to dissolve the historically specific concept of «fascism» (and its synonyms) into a broader and less distinct concept – «totalitarianism». Typically, the semantics of «totalitarianism» is amalgamated into two components, portraying it as a fusion of mass repression and mass propaganda.
The liberal theory of totalitarianism emerged during the Cold War and was utilized as a propaganda tool to delegitimize the adversary. Its purpose was to depict the history of the Second World War as a triumph of democratic forces over those of tyranny – this ideological framework was articulated in Winston Churchill's book «The History of the Second World War».
The function of «totalitarianism» was to obfuscate the contextual landscape formed by the concepts of «Nazism», «racism», and «fascism». A juggling of terms related to this context accompanied political maneuvers aimed at radically altering the perception of racism and Nazism entrenched in mass consciousness – a great inconvenience for liberal propaganda. This approach also facilitated the repositioning of numerous ideological emphases, ultimately leading to a shift in the entire ideological paradigm.
Overall, the success of this approach resulted in the removal of genuine moral and evaluative criteria from the theme of the Great Patriotic War by expunging key concepts such as «aggressor», «victim», «genocide», and «ethnic war». Additionally, Europeans managed to deflect the issue of «German guilt» and the culpability of all fascist bloc countries from the annals of twentieth-century history. The subsequent phase, exemplified notably in the renowned «historians' dispute», entailed a revanchist agenda in Germany focused on «normalizing history» and effectively absolving culpability for initiating the war with the USSR1. Notably, one of the foremost proponents of this revanchist stance, Berlin professor Ernst Nolte, contended that «the policy of physical extermination of Jews carried out by Hitler's fascist regime should be considered in close connection with the issue of the destruction of the civil class in Russia, as well as with the dekulakization, that is, extermination of the peasantry». Nolte further argued that German fascism ought to be evaluated as «a mirror image of the Russian revolution and, to a certain extent, of Marxism»2.
Thus, through political linguistics, a framework was established for reevaluating the outcomes of World War II. Concurrently, as societal consciousness became acclimated to superficial notions of «totalitarianism», serious scholarly inquiry into Nazism and fascism became a societal taboo – a politically expedient outcome. Addressing Nazi revanchism in regions like Ukraine, the Baltic States, and Poland openly would have been unavoidable, a discussion avoided by the ruling class in the West. Consequently, to deepen public engagement with «(anti)totalitarian» issues, there was a concerted effort to emphasize the topic of totalitarianism, evident in cultural events like the notable 1996 exhibition «Berlin – Moscow» at the Pushkin State Museum of Fine Arts.
Upon scrutinizing the liberal theory of totalitarianism, its internal coherence and its system of constructions appear rather fragile. For example, its defenders are often quick to highlight «strong power» as a criterion of a totalitarian society while obscuring technocracy, legalism, and myths of superiority – key elements of the modern era. Typically, the semantics of the concept of «totalitarianism» revolves around a combination of mass repression and mass propaganda.
The liberal interpretation of totalitarianism is based on the notion of «two totalitarianisms» (the «binary» or «bipolar» concept of totalitarianism) or, more broadly, «closed societies», popularized by philosopher and sociologist Karl Popper («The Open Society and its Enemies»), philosopher Hannah Arendt, political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski and others. This concept emerged during the Cold War but has outlasted the opposing political blocs. Its core assertion is that communist and fascist regimes share political kinship and stand in opposition to «liberal democracies».
Indeed, in her work «The Origins of Totalitarianism» (1951), Hannah Arendt delineated two authentic forms of the totalitarian state: the dictatorship of National Socialism after 1938 and the dictatorship of Bolshevism after 1930. These forms of states differ significantly from any kind of dictatorial, despotic or tyrannical rule, although they were the result of the continuous development of party dictatorships, their essentially totalitarian qualities are new and cannot be deduced from one-party dictatorships3.
Arendt's endeavor to distinguish totalitarianism from «mere despotisms» or «mere dictatorships» is notable. However, her assertion that «essentially totalitarian features are new and cannot be derived» from previous forms of governance raises questions. Such reasoning may seem more akin to the language of theosophy than that of a historian. Nonetheless, it's worth noting that Arendt was not a professional historian.
Totalitarian ideology, as described by Arendt, distinguishes itself by its focus on a single theory, be it the theory of national origin or class struggle, from which it derives all social disciplines: philosophy, politics, history, and even theology. Universalism in politics can be interpreted in various ways, but its roots can be traced back at least to the Middle Ages, with Antiquity potentially serving as an even earlier precursor. Throughout history, universalist ideologies have emerged repeatedly in various forms and contexts. Isn't the liberal theory of natural rights, for example, or neo-Freudianism, or any religious fundamentalism, not to mention racism, universal? The answer is no. In this case, the «totality» or universality of a theory cannot be regarded as a definitive criterion for determining its malignancy or negative essence. Another, more significant criterion is required or possibly substituted in this context.
The paradigm of the new political order, which emerged after 1989, was underpinned by the concept of dual totalitarianism. Its socio-political implication is roughly as follows: contemporary policy of force and military «democracy exportation» are somehow justified by the past victims of totalitarian regimes. Essentially, yesterday's totalitarianism is perceived as a form of historical absolution granted to proponents of the new global order.
The technology of influencing collective consciousness within this discourse is relatively straightforward – it involves a continual reminder of historical trauma, appealing not to rationality but to the emotional sphere. This emotional aspect, fueled by infernal symbolism and the motif of absolute evil, coupled with the categorical imperative «This must not happen again!», is prominently featured in the concept of two totalitarianisms.
A prime example of such a strategy is evident in the public activism of Svetlana Alexievich, the author of «The Unwomanly Face of War», a native of Western Ukraine and a Belarusian writer who predominantly writes in Russian. Alexievich argues that even taking an uninvolved stance towards the phenomenon of totalitarianism («I was born later, what does all this oblige me to?») is deemed «insignificant» and wholly totalitarian, as «victims are as despicable as executioners», and there purportedly exists a risk of «a repeat of the Gulag». A similar scheme underlies the formula of the Ukrainian far-right: «Whoever does not jump is a moskal». Here, the identity of the individual in question and whether they are genuinely a «moskal» are inconsequential; what matters is the principle itself. The reality is irrelevant; the principle holds significance. And the principle is that without depicting the dark totalitarian past and its «adherents», a vision of a bright liberal future fails to materialize. This is precisely why the portrayal of a historical adversary – a standardized «totalitarian personality» – became indispensable. This situation resembles one of reversed totalitarianism, wherein individuals encounter real totalitarianism within the context of confronting and internally resisting anti-totalitarian liberal discourses. As predicted by Aldous Huxley, another classic of Western dystopia, «freedom is destroyed under the slogan of defending freedom». Indeed, the discourse of combating the «legacy of totalitarianism» emerged as one of the most totalitarian ideologies at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries.
Already in the 1960s, there emerged political concepts that challenged the «two-totalitarian» liberal orthodoxy. First and foremost, we should mention the representatives of the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School. Its senior representatives, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, viewed fascism as the by-product of two profound historical processes: first, the imposition of Enlightenment rationality standards on Europe; and second, a reactionary response to these standards from the irrational layers of European culture (Nazi countermodern or archaeomodern).
Herbert Marcuse, a member of the second generation of Frankfurters, a cult figure revered by the rebellious youth of the 1960s, the guru of radical students, asserted that the repressive mechanisms of postmodern liberal society cultivate a «fascizoid» form of consciousness, characterized by a one-dimensional existence. And it accomplishes this no less successfully than its 'totalitarian' counterparts. An example of a state embodying «hidden fascism» for Marcuse and his fellow thinkers was, notably, the United States of America, characterized by a large population of ordinary rednecks.
In the context of left-wing criticism, the ideological framework of the twentieth century, premised on the notion of «two bad theories, one good», began to appear questionable as early as the 1960s and 70s. However, it's crucial to note that the Frankfurters did not outright challenge the concept of totalitarianism itself, nor did they even attempt to restrict its scope, as conservative critics on the right often did. Instead, they opted to expand the concept, extending its boundaries. From their viewpoint, any repressive mechanism seemed to be indicative of latent fascism.
While opponents of the theory, as mentioned earlier, highlighted the distinct social bases of the two regimes – communism appealing to the lower classes and fascism/Nazism to the affluent bourgeoisie and radicalized («maddened», according to Antonio Gramsci) middle class – this alone wasn't adequate for a systematic critique of the «dual» theory of totalitarianism. To achieve a more comprehensive critique, it was essential to understand why the political mainstream of the twentieth century – liberalism – consistently evaded scrutiny within post-totalitarian studies.
The perspective of sociologist and historian Immanuel Wallerstein, as outlined in his work «After Liberalism», offers an intriguing viewpoint on this matter. One notable aspect is his view of fascism and communism not as two ideologies diametrically opposed to liberal «democracy», but rather as components of a broader liberal project dating back to 1789. This aligns with the opinion expressed by Max Horkheimer, a founding member of the Frankfurt School, who once remarked, «The totalitarian regime is nothing but its predecessor, the bourgeois-democratic order, which suddenly lost its inhibitions».
Indeed, Russian left-wing authors have offered intriguing insights into the evolution of the doctrine of totalitarianism. Alexander Tarasov's article «Stirlitz's Mistake. Why Do They Need the ”Theory of Totalitarianism?”»4 provides a particularly indicative perspective.The article explores the discussion reflected in collections like «The Past: Russian and German Approaches».
The concept of «totalitarianism» and its associated universality often serve as a means for researchers to sidestep the most complex questions of historical processes. By dividing, akin to the Manichean spirit, the history of the twentieth century into zones of natural and unnatural development, they can easily navigate moral condemnations of «totalitarian methods» in politics and economics, while neglecting deeper analyses of social structures and processes. This approach leads to predetermined conclusions. However, it is often overlooked that periods labeled as «totalitarianism» are closely intertwined with phases of «normal development», displaying a certain cyclical pattern and correlation with periods of crises. In this light, it would be more accurate to discuss not just totalitarianism or «totalitarianisms», but rather the state of totalitarianism inherent in Western society as a whole.
The liberal system, which frequently adopts a Nazi-racist format, can indeed be characterized as totalitarian, but this attribute does not fully capture its primary cultural and historical essence.
Karl Popper's book «The Open Society and its Enemies»5 is often regarded as one of cornerstones of the binary concept of totalitarianism. In this work, a pair of pivotal concepts, «closed» and «open» society, serve as analogues to the antinomy of «totalitarianism and democracy». While the book garnered significant attention upon its publication, the dilemma of public openness versus closeness has evolved in meaning over time. By the 1990s and 2000s, it became evident that what was referred to as an «open» society comprised a series of «closed» corporate structures with even more stringent external and internal ideologies than those of state autocracies. Conversely, with the advancement of information technologies and the rise of information inequality, the focus shifted from «openness» to the challenge of ensuring information security.
According to philosopher Ulrich Beck, the first half of the 21st century witnesses the emergence of the so-called «risk society», characterized by a significant increase in social threats ranging from terrorism and warfare to environmental disasters. In this society, individuals become part of a collective «world danger team»6. Beck argues that the traditional struggle of ideas is being supplanted by a struggle to identify risks. Thus, sociology, as a meta-discipline in the socio-humanitarian sphere, should assume the role of defining the riskogenics, a trend Beck labels the «New Enlightenment».
It is quite obvious that this concept also opens the door to the proliferation of new totalitarian tendencies in society, driven by alarmist managerial voluntarism and methods of collective intimidation that may supplant conventional forms of governance. Social criticism will undoubtedly be dismissed as merely exacerbating risks, and advocates for social justice and guarantees will be labeled as dangerous populists.
The «New Enlightenment» subproject aims to supersede the previous notion of a privileged «urban creative class» with the concept of a super-creative digital environment. This environment incorporates new participants from the digital sphere, who navigate it with bundles of «postmaterial values» inherited from the creative class, leaving digital footprints as they engage.
Total digitalization represents a form of artificial intelligence that differs from traditional conceptions. Rather than operating as an independent entity external to individuals, it harnesses the neural resources of individuals themselves, utilizes the structure of the human psyche, and models the behavior of algorithmized human communities within the framework of «social platforms».
This goes beyond merely narrowing the individual's rational choice possibilities, which, according to the liberal dictionary, would be deemed a totalitarian tendency. We are now discussing the technogenic restructuring of the most cognitive aspects of human beings, essentially the «enhancement» of their inner nature (transhumanism), which amounts to a form of neo-eugenics and signifies a clear trend toward fascization. The prerequisite for transitioning to this new state is society's willingness to view ideological, ethical, and scientific issues as technical, managerial, and logistical matters linked to the manipulation of digital data sets. All of this, of course, effectively absolves the managerial class of responsibility for decision-making.
Under these circumstances, any theory of totalitarianism, if it remains coherent, must delve into the study of man-made cults born out of the neo-Nazi and liberal-racist paradigm emerging in the early 21st century. However, the need to reconsider this theory emerged long before. Particularly, it became inevitable when fascism resurfaced in Europe.
Today, as we undertake a serious analysis of the regression of political consciousness in the 20th century, we are compelled to move beyond the concept of «totalitarianism» and re-engage with the issues of Nazism and racism – far more precise terms that accurately describe historical phenomena of both the past and, regrettably, the present.
2024 ãîä
